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14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to. | |
From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is') | |
A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain. |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families]. | |
From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc') | |
A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference. |