Combining Texts
Ideas for
'On Propositions: What they are,and Meaning', 'Human Knowledge: its scope and limits' and 'What Does It Take to Refer?'
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18 ideas
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
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10446
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Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
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10447
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We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
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10443
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You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
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10439
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What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
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10441
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If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
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10442
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We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
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10445
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It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
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10457
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Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
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10463
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Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
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10459
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Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
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10460
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'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
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10461
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What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
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10462
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Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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5781
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Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
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5782
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A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
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5776
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A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
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16491
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If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
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10458
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People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
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