Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', 'Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed)' and 'The Conscious Mind'
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15 ideas
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9022
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Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14708
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Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
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13958
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The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
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2399
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Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
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13959
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The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
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13957
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Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
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13961
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We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
6091
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Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
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13962
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Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
21702
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In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
6094
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An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
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6096
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I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
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21712
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I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
13960
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In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
6093
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The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
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