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Ideas for 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', 'Principles of Theoretical Logic' and 'Truth and Predication'

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19 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
19149 If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19163 You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
19152 Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19162 Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
19131 We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
19156 Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
9022 Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
19176 The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
19133 If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
19132 Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19158 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
6091 Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
21702 In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
6094 An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
6096 I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
21712 I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
6093 The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
19154 The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
19161 We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]