Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Are there propositions?', 'works' and 'Category Mistakes'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
32 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13978
|
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
|
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
13977
|
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
|
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
13467
|
Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD]
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
18008
|
Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor]
|
18010
|
'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor]
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
18053
|
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor]
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
18000
|
Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor]
|
17999
|
Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor]
|
18014
|
Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13976
|
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
18001
|
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13981
|
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
|
13987
|
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
13989
|
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
|
13982
|
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
|
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
18036
|
A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor]
|
18051
|
In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor]
|
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
18043
|
The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor]
|
18042
|
The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor]
|
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / c. Presupposition
18047
|
A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor]
|
18048
|
A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor]
|
18049
|
The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor]
|
18050
|
If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor]
|
18054
|
Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor]
|
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
18024
|
One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor]
|
18023
|
Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor]
|
18025
|
The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor]
|
18026
|
Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor]
|
18028
|
Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor]
|
18029
|
Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor]
|
18022
|
Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor]
|
18027
|
Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor]
|