Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'Is Mathematics purely Linguistic?' and 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind'
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16 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
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6282
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Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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6281
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Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
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6278
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We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
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3181
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A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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3204
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The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
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3205
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Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
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6271
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How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
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3209
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Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey]
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3210
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If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
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3149
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Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
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6268
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The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
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6279
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A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
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3169
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A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
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6270
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The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
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6283
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Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
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6275
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You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
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