Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'A Priori' and 'On the True Doctrine (Against Christians)'
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11 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6282
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Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6281
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Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
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6278
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We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6271
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How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
6268
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The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
17701
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Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
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Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
6279
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A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6270
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The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
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6283
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Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6275
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You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
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