Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'Are there propositions?' and 'Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty'
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16 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6282
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Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
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13978
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Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
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When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
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6278
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We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6271
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How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
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The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13981
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Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
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13987
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We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
13989
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There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
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13982
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If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
6279
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A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
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The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
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6283
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Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6275
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You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
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