Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Denoting' and 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

22 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4567 Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
5810 Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
16385 A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
5774 Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
5775 In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
16987 By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4570 Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
16349 Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
7313 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7767 The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
21726 In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]