Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Theory of Communicative Action', 'Categories' and 'Mental Files'
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22 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
15667
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To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
15668
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Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
16356
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There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
16393
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In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati]
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16386
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Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
16372
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Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati]
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16388
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We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati]
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16359
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Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
16355
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Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]
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16348
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Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
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16384
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Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati]
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16352
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A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati]
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16353
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Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
12349
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Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
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11837
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Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
16382
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Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
16389
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If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati]
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16363
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Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati]
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16364
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Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16351
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In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
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16350
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Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
16380
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Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]
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