Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Theory of Communicative Action', 'Are there propositions?' and 'The Nature of Judgement'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
11 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
|
13978
|
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
|
|
15667
|
To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
|
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
|
13977
|
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
|
|
15668
|
Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
|
13976
|
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
|
22302
|
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
|
13981
|
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
|
|
13987
|
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
|
7526
|
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
|
13989
|
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
|
|
13982
|
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
|