Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Elm and the Expert', 'Why Propositions cannot be concrete' and 'Dispositional Modality'
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9 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2439
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Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
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2457
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If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
2451
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To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2433
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For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2436
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It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
2434
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Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2459
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Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
9085
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If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
9084
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Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
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