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Ideas for
'The Elm and the Expert', 'works' and 'Begriffsschrift'
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13 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
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2439
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Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
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2457
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If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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7307
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A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
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2451
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To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
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2433
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For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
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2436
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It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
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2434
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Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
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22280
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Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
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7309
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Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
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7312
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'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
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2459
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Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
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7725
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'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
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7316
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Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
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