Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'On Denoting' and 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge'
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12 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
13410
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Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4567
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Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
5810
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Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
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16385
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A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
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5774
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Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
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5775
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In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
16987
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By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4570
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Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
16349
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Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
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7313
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'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7767
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The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
21726
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In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
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