Combining Texts
Ideas for
'New Scientist articles', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'The Logic of What Might Have Been'
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7 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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7768
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The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
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7766
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Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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7764
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Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
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7763
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It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
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7770
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Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
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7773
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A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
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7774
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Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]
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