Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences'

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17 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6282 Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
23482 The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
8172 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
6281 Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
6278 We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
7086 Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6271 How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
6268 The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
23511 Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein]
23488 Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
23486 Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
23497 Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
6279 A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
23489 We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6270 The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
6283 Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6275 You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]