Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Posterior Analytics' and 'Truth-maker Realism: response to Gregory'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Aristotle distinguishes between deductive reasoning (sullogismos) and demonstration (apodeixis). All demonstration is deductive reasoning, but not all deductive reasoning is demonstration.
     From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], Bk I.2) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 5.3
     A reaction: This sounds not far off the distinction between single-turnstile (formal proof) and double-turnstile (semantic consequence). Politis says, though, that the key point is the demonstration is explanatory.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Some optimists think understanding arises only through demonstration, but say there could be demonstration of everything, for it is possible to demonstrate in a circle or reciprocally.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72b16)
     A reaction: I'm an optimist in this sense, though what is being described would probably best be called 'large-scale coherence'. Two reciprocal arguments look bad, but a hundred look good.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There are falsehoods which are contrary to one another and cannot be the case together e.g. that a man is a horse or a cow.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 88a29)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Definitions are thought to be of what something is, and what something is is in every case universal and positive.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 90b05)
     A reaction: This is exhibit A for those who think that Aristotelian essences concern the genus, rather than the particular. I suspect that this idea is best expressed as 'all we can say by way of definition of a particular thing involves the use of universals'.
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
     Full Idea: An Aristotelian definition is causal.
     From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], Bk II.2) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 1.5
     A reaction: [She refers us to Posterior Analytics II.2] This is important if we are tempted to follow a modern line of saying that we want Aristotelian essences, and that these are definitions. We ain't thinking of dictionaries.
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: To establish a definition through division, you must aim for three things: you must take what is predicated in what the thing is; you must order these items as first or second; and you must ensure that these are all there are.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 97a23)
     A reaction: This gives an indication of the thoroughness that Aristotle expects from a definition. They aren't like dictionary definitions of words. He expects definitions to often be very lengthy (see Idea 12292).
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Find what is in common among items similar and undifferentiated, then do the same for items of the same kind as the first group but a different form, and so on, till you come to a single account: this will be the definition of the object.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 97b07-14)
     A reaction: [His example is distinguishing 'magnanimity' from 'indifference to fortune' among people] Presumably this process works for the formation of new concepts (e.g. in biology), as well as for the definition of familiars in terms of other familiars.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: What it is and why it is are the same. What is an eclipse? Privation of light from the moon by screening of the earth. Why is there an eclipse? ...What is a harmony? A numerical ratio between high and low. Why do the high and low harmonize? The ratio.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 90a15)
     A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotelian essentialism, and (I take it) modern scientific essentialism. If you fully know what cigarette tars are, and what human cell structure is, you understand immediately why cigarettes cause cancer.