display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
| 4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
| A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
| 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
| Full Idea: In this whole business of genera and species, the genus, or more comprehensive, but a partial conception of what is in the species, and the species but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.32) | |
| A reaction: This is my feeling on the subject, that any definition that stops short of the individual, whence all categorisation flows, is inadequate. |
| 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Locke may have gone a long way towards describing the real essence of a person. | |
| From: report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.09) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 30.5 | |
| A reaction: Locke resisted the idea that we could know real essences, but this idea makes the point that if you give a good definition of something you can hardly fail to be invoking its essence. |