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3 ideas
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Definitions to my mind are real, when one knows that the thing defined is possible; otherwise they are only nominal, and one must not rely on them. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 XI) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that things do not have to actual to have real definitions. For Leibniz, what is possible will exist in the mind of God. For me what is possible will exist in the potentialities of the powers of what is actual. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |