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8200
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Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
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Full Idea:
A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us.
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From:
report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51
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A reaction:
Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'.
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16539
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A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
If the definition of a circle is based on 'locus of a point', this tells us what a circle is, and it does so by revealing its generating principle, what it takes for a circle to come into being.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
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A reaction:
Lowe says that real definitions, as essences, do not always have to spell out a 'generating principle', but they do in this case. Another approach would be to try to map dependence relations between truths about circles, and see what is basic.
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16540
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Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
Defining an ellipse in terms of the oblique intersection of a cone and a plane (rather than in terms of the sum of the distance between the foci) gives us a necessary property, but not the essence, because the terms are extrinsic to its nature.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
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A reaction:
[compressed wording] Helpful and illuminating. If you say some figure is what results when one thing intersects another, that doesn't tell you what the result actually is. Geometrical essences may be a bit vague, but they are quite meaningful.
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16548
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An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
An entity's essence is just what that entity is, revealed by its real definition. This isn't a distinct entity, but either the entity itself, or (my view) no entity at all. ..We should not reify essence, as that leads to an infinite regress of essences.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
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A reaction:
The regress problem is a real one, if we wish to treat an essence as some proper and distinct part of an entity. If it is a mechanism, for example, the presumably a mechanism has an essence. No, it doesn't! Levels of explanation!
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