Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'De Corpore (Elements, First Section)' and 'Community and Citizenship'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value.
     From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos
     From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Definitions of things which may be understood to have some cause, must consist of such names as express the cause or manner of their generation, as when we define a circle to be a figure made by the circumduction of a straight line in a plane etc.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.13)
     A reaction: His account of the circle is based on its mode of construction, which is the preferred account of Euclid, rather than a statement of its pure nature.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
     Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51
     A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157
     A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus?
Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: The definition is nothing but a resolution of the name into its most universal parts; ...definitions of this kind always consist of genus and difference; the former names being all, till the last, general; and the last of all, difference.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.14)
     A reaction: This is basically the scholastic Aristotelian view of definition. Note that Hobbes explicitly denies that the last step of the definition is general in character.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: A defined name ought not to be repeated in the definition. ...No total can be part of itself.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.15)
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: 'Petitio principii' is when the conclusion to be proved is disguised in other words, and put for the definition or principle from whence it is to be demonstrated.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.18)