display all the ideas for this combination of texts
29 ideas
| 623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1074b11) |
| 6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible for the same thing at the same time both to be-in and not to be-in the same thing in the same respect. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1005b19) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is really discussing non-contradiction here, but this formulation is very close to Leibniz's Law (that two identical things must have identical properties). |
| 1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The most certain of all basic principles is that contradictory propositions are not true at the same time. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b13) | |
| A reaction: Principle of Noncontradiction |
| 11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle goes to great lengths to defend the principle of non-contradiction, and does not at all think that it is obviously true. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], logic) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 5.1 |
| 11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible to say truly at the same time that the same thing both is and is not a man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1006b33) |
| 1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The Principle of Noncontradiction is for Aristotle the ultimate regulator of predication. In order for any predication to be significant it must refer to something definite and stable. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b13) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.152 |
| 608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: With contradiction there can be no intermediate state, whereas with contrariety there can be. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1055b02) |
| 627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If all things are composed of opposites, how can the things of which the opposites are made be composed of opposites? | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a23) | |
| A reaction: A nice warning against being too simplistic in metaphysics. |
| 628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All things are not composed of opposites, because matter is not the opposite of anything. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a28) | |
| A reaction: A nice counterexample |
| 10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The definition is an account, and every account has its parts, and there is an isomorphism between the relation of the account to the entity that it concerns and the relation of a part of the account to a part of the entity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1034b20) | |
| A reaction: This makes a definition sound like a catalogue of parts, which is likely to miss something important, such as the overall form, or the function. Aristotle has much more to say on the subject of definition. Cf. Russell's congruence view of truth. |
| 10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One strays from the purpose of definitions if one confines oneself to a formal account and simply discards the material element. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1036b20) |
| 10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What makes it the case that, if we call the account of something a 'definition', that thing is a unity? If 'two-footed animal' is the account of man, and a definition, why, then, is 'man' a single thing and not a plurality (viz. animal and two-footed)? | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037b10) | |
| A reaction: The obvious answer, I would have thought, is that we can think of man as a unity or as a plurality, depending on which aspect we are interested in. I see no problem with this. Nature offers us unities, but we ultimately select them. |
| 16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible to define particulars. …The fact is that an account is general. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1040a33-) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle rejects attempts to define the Sun as possible counterexamples. Since this claims rests on the idea of an account [logos], I presume the point is actually that definitions are linguistic, and must use general words. |
| 596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Only substance admits of definition. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030b34) |
| 16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In some instances the account of the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing contains the parts of the thing defined and in others not. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a22) | |
| A reaction: This is helpful in understanding what an essence is supposed to be. I take it to be sometimes a structure, with parts, and sometimes more like a guiding principle, more abstract in character. |
| 10944 | A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We can assign a term to any 'account' whatever, so that the Iliad would be a definition! No, a definition must be of something primary. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a08) | |
| A reaction: At first hearing you may doubt this claim, but Aristotle's example clinches it beautifully. Are you really going to say that The Iliad is the definition of 'Iliad'? |
| 12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| Full Idea: Met. Z.10-11 is committed to the complexity of form and suggests that the complexity is expressed in definitions that articulate, in the case of 'man', the salient faculties and functions, and none of these need mention 'man'. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1034b20-1037b) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.5 | |
| A reaction: This is a very strong statement of the view that identifying genus and species are not at all what Aristotle wants in his final account of essence. The features mentioned here would, though, clearly count as 'differentiae'. |
| 12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: 'Plane' is the genus of figures in the plane, and 'solid' is the genus of solids. For every figure is either a plane with abc features or a solid with xyz features, so it is the plane and solid which underlie these differentiae. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1024b01) | |
| A reaction: Thus you could hardly define a square by merely mentioning that it is a 'plane figure', and you would need pretty precise differentiae before you could be certain you were only dealing with a square, and not a parallelogram. |
| 12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If Callias is a white man, then whiteness belongs in a way to Callias, or to man, in as much as Callias, to whom it is accidental here to be a man, is white. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030b20) | |
| A reaction: The point here is that 'white' can only belong to 'man' because some individual man happens to be white. |
| 11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A definition is of the universal [tou katholou] and the form [tou eidous, kind, species]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1036a28) | |
| A reaction: [Alternative translations by Vasilis Politis] Since the essence of a thing is a particular (Idea 11382), this seems to mean that the definition is NOT giving the essence, contrary to the account of Kit Fine. I take the essence to be explanatory. |
| 10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The contents of definition by division are the so-called primary genus (such as 'animal') and the differentiae. ...It should always be prosecuted until the level of non-differentiation is reached, ...and the last differentia will be the substance. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037b30) | |
| A reaction: [Second half at 1038a14] Note that this is only one type of Aristotelian definition, the 'definition by division'. The aim of this type of definition is to analyse down to substance. Presumably you can't ignore crucial features found on the way? |
| 12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If the genus simpliciter does not exist over and above the specific forms constitutive of it, alternatively if it exists just as matter, it is evident what the definition is, the account derived just from the differentiae. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038a05-) | |
| A reaction: This is how I understand an Aristotelian definition - as a lengthy and fine-grained account of the details which pick out some individual within the main genus which constitutes it. |
| 17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Suppose I was trying to define you. I would say you are an animal that is lean or white or some such, all of which also apply to other things. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1040a13) | |
| A reaction: Commentators have taken this to mean that Aristotle is only interested in kinds and not individuals, but recent thinking says this is wrong. Universals prevent you from really getting at the thing you want to define. Definitions are limited. |
| 12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| Full Idea: Species and genera are largely irrelevant to the program of 'Metaphysics'. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], kind) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.10 | |
| A reaction: The idea seems to be that Aristotle is seeking tools for getting at the primary being of a thing, and the notion of 'form' strikes him as a better account, because it explains the genera and species, rather than just naming them. |
| 12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| Full Idea: I take Aristotle to be arguing that no definition applies uniquely to an individual - it is always potentially applicable to a range of individuals. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], defs) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.2 n7 | |
| A reaction: So much the worse for Aristotle, I think. Surely unique entities can be defined? No one thinks their pet dog is just any dog, even after the age and breed have been identified. |
| 11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1031a12) | |
| A reaction: This is cited by Kit Fine, as expounding his view that essence is definition. He gives this text as "definition is the formula of the essence". Is the account the 'logos', I wonder? I like this view. |
| 12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle never thought of an essence as comprising all the necessary properties of an object. In Met VII.4 he limits per se predication appropriate to essences to the definition, and in Topics he distinguishes definition from the 'proprium'. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 4.1 | |
| A reaction: [Topics 102a20-25] There seems to be consensus among scholars about this, and only a few misguided modern metaphysicians identify essences with the necessary properties (or maybe the non-trivial necessary properties). |
| 15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not right to seek a definition for everything - for some things an overview is to be had by analogy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1048a33) | |
| A reaction: This is what David Lewis called the 'way of example' in defining what is meant by 'abstract objects'. |
| 574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It must be true, quite generally, that not everything can be proven, on pain of an infinite regress. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1006a09) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 1672, where the possibility of a circular set of mutual proofs is considered. Aristotle seems committed to the present idea. |