Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'After Finitude' and 'Model Theory'

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5 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

19649	Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
	Full Idea: Since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined with reference to the object in itself, but rather with reference to the possible universality of an objective statement.
	From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1)
	A reaction: Meillassoux disapproves of this, as a betrayal by philosophers of the scientific revolution, which gave us true objectivity (e.g. about how the world was before humanity).

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason

5969	Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
	Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c
	A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'.

19666	If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
	Full Idea: So long as we continue to believe that there is a reason why things are the way they are rather than some other way, we will construe this world is a mystery, since no such reason will every be vouchsafed to us.
	From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4)
	A reaction: Giving up sufficient reason sounds like a rather drastic response to this. Put it like this: Will we ever be able to explain absolutely everything? No. So will the world always be a little mysterious to us? Yes, obviously. Is that a problem? No!

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

19656	Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
	Full Idea: The principle of non-contradiction itself is without reason, and consequently it can only be the norm for what is thinkable by us, rather than for what is possible in the absolute sense.
	From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2)
	A reaction: This is not Meillassoux's view, but describes the modern heresy of 'correlationism', which ties all assessments of how reality is to our capacity to think about it. Personally I take logical non-contradiction to derive from non-contradiction in nature.

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition

10476	The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W]
	Full Idea: Late nineteenth century mathematicians said that, although plus, minus and 0 could not be precisely defined, they could be partially 'implicitly defined' as a group. This nonsense was rejected by Frege and others, as expressed in Russell 1903.
	From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 2)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is helpful in understanding what is going on in Frege's 'Grundlagen'. I won't challenge Hodges's claim that such definitions are nonsense, but there is a case for understanding groups of concepts together.