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5 ideas
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The essence of gold is what constitutes it and gives it the sensible qualities which let us recognize it and which make its nominal definition; but if we could explain this structure or inner constitution we would possess the real, causal definition. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: This is the view which I am championing, particularly in the role of explanation in the whole game. Explanation and understanding are the hallmarks of the discovery of a real essence. However, a falsehood may explain things well. Tricky. |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Although a thing has only one essence, this can be expressed by several definitions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12976 and Idea 12977 for a view which seems to conflict with this. He seemed to imply that once you identify the essence, the definitions converge, with multiple definitions being symptomatic of imperfect ideas of things. |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The result of having an imperfect idea of something is that the same subject admits of several mutually independent definitions: we shall sometimes be unable to derive one from another, or see in advance that they must belong to a single subject. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.31) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12975 for imperfect ideas of things. Obviously the idea is that perfect knowledge will converge on a single definition, which will pinpoint the essence of a thing, and then all explanations will flow. A nice addition to the Aristotelian view. |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The real definition displays the possibility of the definiendum, and the nominal definition does not. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: This, I take it, is because the real definition indicates the actual powers of the thing, and not just the superficial characteristics. Is knowledge of powers identical with knowledge of possibilities? |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The genus can very often be turned into the differentia, ...so that in place of saying that man is a 'reasonable animal' we could, if language permitted, say that man is an 'animable rational', a rational substance with animal nature. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03) | |
A reaction: This is a very telling point which rather undermines any dogmatic approach to what Aristotle says about these sorts of definitions. I don't find this account of definitions very helpful anyway. Leibniz links it to the order of cataloguing. |