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Ideas for 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues', 'The Nature of Thought' and 'Nihilism without Self-Contradiction'

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3 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
     From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
     A reaction: Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.
We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Coherence involves the logical, explanatory and probabilistic relations among one's beliefs, but it could not do to attain a tightly iterrelated system by lopping off whatever beliefs refuse to fit.
     From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.4)
     A reaction: This is clearly right, so the coherentist has to distinguish between lopping off a belief because it is inconvenient (fundamentalists rejecting textual contradictions), and lopping it off because it is wrong (chemists rejecting phlogiston).
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins]
     Full Idea: We should interpret philosophers as if their own theory of the meaning of their utterances were true, whether or not we agree with that theory.
     From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8)
     A reaction: This seems to give legitimate grounds for some sorts of ad hominem objections. It would simply be an insult to a philosopher not to believe their theories, and then apply them to what they have said. This includes semantic theories.