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4 ideas
20573 | Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala] |
Full Idea: Instead of Enlightenment instrumental rationality (criticised by Adorno and Horkheimer), Habermas emphasizes 'communicative rationality', which makes critical discussion and mutual understanding possible. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.6 | |
A reaction: There was a good reason not to smoke cigarettes, before we found out what it is. In one sense, reasons are in the world. This is interesting, but I feel analytic vertigo, as the lovely concept of 'rationality' becomes blurred and diffused. |
16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
Full Idea: We construct a sense out of its constituents and introduce an entirely new sign to express this sense. This may be called a 'constructive definition', but we prefer to call it a 'definition' tout court. It contrasts with an 'analytic' definition. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.210) | |
A reaction: An analytic definition is evidently a deconstruction of a past constructive definition. Fregean definition is a creative activity. |
11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
Full Idea: Frege has defended the austere view that, in mathematics at least, only stipulative definitions should be countenanced. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914]) by Anil Gupta - Definitions 1.3 | |
A reaction: This sounds intriguingly at odds with Frege's well-known platonism about numbers (as sets of equinumerous sets). It makes sense for other mathematical concepts. |
16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
Full Idea: It is so important, if we are to have a clear insight into what is going on, for us to be able to recognise the premises of every inference which occurs in a proof and the law of inference in accordance with which it takes place. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.212) | |
A reaction: Teachers of logic like natural deduction, because it reduces everything to a few clear laws, which can be stated at each step. |