display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between entailment and validity as logical relations on the one hand, and inferring as a voluntary human activity on the other. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
Full Idea: Theoretical reason is typically a matter of accepting a conclusion or hypothesis on the basis of argument or evidence, and is thus a special case of practical reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII) |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
Full Idea: Constraints of rationality are built into the structure of mind and language, specifically into the structure of intentionality and speech acts. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Int xiv) |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
Full Idea: The constraints of rationality ought to be thought of adverbially; they are a matter of the way in which we coordinate our intentionality. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Socrates has no definition if definitions by their nature must be in purely general terms, and if no purely general terms can succeed in uniquely singling out this signated matter. | |
From: report of Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], 23) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.1.2 | |
A reaction: There seem to be two models. That general terms actually individuate the matter of Socrates, or that they cross-reference to (so to speak) define Socrates 'by elimination', as the only individual that fits. But the latter is a poor definition. |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: What sorts things into their proper genus and species are the definitions that express what they are. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.92) | |
A reaction: This is straight from Aristotle, though Aristotle's view is a little more complex, I think. If the definitions 'express what they are', then definitions seem to specify the essence. |