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Ideas for 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy', 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'' and 'Intro to 'Philosophical Essays''

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: You do not improve the truth value of a false proposition by calling attention to a coherent system of propositions of which it is one.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Intro to 'Philosophical Essays' [1987], xi)
     A reaction: We need to disentangle the truth-value from the justification here. If it is false, then we can safely assume that is false, but we are struggling to decide whether it is false, and we want all the evidence we can get. Falsehood tends towards incoherence.
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Every intellectual determination has its antithesis, its contradiction. Truth exists not in unity with, but in refutation of its opposite.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.72)
     A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of the 'synthesis' in Hegel, in favour of what strikes me as a rather more sensible interpretation of the modern dialectic. Being exists in contrast to nothingness, and truth exists in contrast to its negation?
A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: A thinker is a dialectician only insofar as he is his own opponent.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.72)
     A reaction: Quite an inspirational slogan for beginners in philosophy. How many non-philosophers are willing to be their own opponent. In law courts and the House of Commons we assign the roles to separate persons. Hence rhetoric replaces reason?
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.