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Ideas for 'Intensional Logic', 'Review of Parsons (1983)' and 'Logic in Mathematics'

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3 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
     Full Idea: We construct a sense out of its constituents and introduce an entirely new sign to express this sense. This may be called a 'constructive definition', but we prefer to call it a 'definition' tout court. It contrasts with an 'analytic' definition.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.210)
     A reaction: An analytic definition is evidently a deconstruction of a past constructive definition. Fregean definition is a creative activity.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta]
     Full Idea: Frege has defended the austere view that, in mathematics at least, only stipulative definitions should be countenanced.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914]) by Anil Gupta - Definitions 1.3
     A reaction: This sounds intriguingly at odds with Frege's well-known platonism about numbers (as sets of equinumerous sets). It makes sense for other mathematical concepts.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege]
     Full Idea: It is so important, if we are to have a clear insight into what is going on, for us to be able to recognise the premises of every inference which occurs in a proof and the law of inference in accordance with which it takes place.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.212)
     A reaction: Teachers of logic like natural deduction, because it reduces everything to a few clear laws, which can be stated at each step.