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Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'fragments/reports' and 'Non-foundationalist epistemology'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
     Full Idea: How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? How can their relation to other less than tenable enhance their tenability?
     From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.157)
     A reaction: Her example is witnesses to a crime. Bayes Theorem appears to deal with individual items. "The thief had green hair" becomes more likely with multiple testimony. This is a very persuasive first step towards justification as coherence.
Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
     Full Idea: The best explanation of coherence (where the components of a coherent account must be mutually consistent, cotenable and supportive) is that the account is at least roughly true.
     From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.158)
     A reaction: Note that she is NOT employing a coherence account of truth (which I take to be utterly wrong). It is notoriously difficult to define coherence. If the components must be 'tenable', they have epistemic status apart from their role in coherence.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Fourteenth mode: reasoning requires arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Twelfth mode: all reasoning leads on to further reasoning, and this process goes on forever.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Fifteenth mode: proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Eleventh mode: all topics of discussion are full of uncertainty and contradiction.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10