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Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)' and 'Non-foundationalist epistemology'

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3 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Among the inferential virtues commonly cited are mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, and fit with background beliefs.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding')
     A reaction: [He cites Hempel, Kuhn, Quine, and Newton-Smith] I take the over-arching term 'coherence' to cover much of this, though a bolder hypothesis offers more than mere coherence.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
     Full Idea: How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? How can their relation to other less than tenable enhance their tenability?
     From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.157)
     A reaction: Her example is witnesses to a crime. Bayes Theorem appears to deal with individual items. "The thief had green hair" becomes more likely with multiple testimony. This is a very persuasive first step towards justification as coherence.
Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
     Full Idea: The best explanation of coherence (where the components of a coherent account must be mutually consistent, cotenable and supportive) is that the account is at least roughly true.
     From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.158)
     A reaction: Note that she is NOT employing a coherence account of truth (which I take to be utterly wrong). It is notoriously difficult to define coherence. If the components must be 'tenable', they have epistemic status apart from their role in coherence.