Combining Texts

Ideas for 'reports', 'Hermeneutics: a very short introduction' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement'

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3 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
We take part in objective truth, rather than observe it from a distance [Zimmermann,J]
     Full Idea: Hermeneutic thinkers insist that we need to redefine objective truth as something we take part in rather than something we merely observe from a distance.
     From: Jens Zimmermann (Hermeneutics: a very short introduction [2015], 1 'Truth')
     A reaction: Don't get it. If I objectively judge that there are some cows in a field, I judge that they will probably still be there if I turn away and forget them, so any passionate involvement I have with cows is irrelevant to the objective facts. Am I wrong?
Hermeneutic knowledge is not objective, but embraces interpretations [Zimmermann,J]
     Full Idea: In the hermeneutic ideal of knowledge, not distance but involvement, not impersonal observation but personal interaction, not thinking against prejudice or tradition but accessing knowledge through them, characterizes our perception of the world.
     From: Jens Zimmermann (Hermeneutics: a very short introduction [2015], 3 'Beyond')
     A reaction: To make this stick it will have to challenge scientific knowledge which results from mathematical summaries of measurements done by instruments. Is a stop watch an interpretation?
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
     Full Idea: It is a good argument ad hominem, if it can be shewn that a first principle which a man rejects, stands upon the same footing with others which he admits, …for he must then be guilty of an inconsistency.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
     A reaction: Good point. You can't divorce 'pure' reason from the reasoners, because the inconsistency of two propositions only matters when they are both asserted together. …But attacking the ideas isn't quite the same as attacking the person.