Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason' and 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence'

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2 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: A statement expressing a real definition must also accomplish more than simply to offer two different ways of singling out the same entity, since the definiens must also be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)
     A reaction: This is why Aristotelian definitions are not just short lexicographical definitions, but may be quite length. Effectively, a definition IS an explanation.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner]
     Full Idea: A transcendental proof converts a possibility into a necessity: by saying under what conditions experience of objects is possible, transcendental proofs show those conditions to be necessary for us to the extent that we have any experience of objects.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 02 'Transc')
     A reaction: They appear to be hypothetical necessities, rather than true metaphysical necessities. Gardner is discussing Kant, but seems to be generalising. Hypothetical necessities are easy: if it is flying, it is necessarily above the ground.