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Ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression' and 'The Principles of Mathematics'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: Since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined with reference to the object in itself, but rather with reference to the possible universality of an objective statement.
     From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1)
     A reaction: Meillassoux disapproves of this, as a betrayal by philosophers of the scientific revolution, which gave us true objectivity (e.g. about how the world was before humanity).
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: So long as we continue to believe that there is a reason why things are the way they are rather than some other way, we will construe this world is a mystery, since no such reason will every be vouchsafed to us.
     From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4)
     A reaction: Giving up sufficient reason sounds like a rather drastic response to this. Put it like this: Will we ever be able to explain absolutely everything? No. So will the world always be a little mysterious to us? Yes, obviously. Is that a problem? No!
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: The principle of non-contradiction itself is without reason, and consequently it can only be the norm for what is thinkable by us, rather than for what is possible in the absolute sense.
     From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2)
     A reaction: This is not Meillassoux's view, but describes the modern heresy of 'correlationism', which ties all assessments of how reality is to our capacity to think about it. Personally I take logical non-contradiction to derive from non-contradiction in nature.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell]
     Full Idea: A definition as an analysis of an idea into its constituents is inconvenient and, I think, useless; it overlooks the fact that wholes are not, as a rule, determinate when their constituents are given.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §108)
     A reaction: The influence of Leibniz seems rather strong here, since he was obsessed with explaining what creates true unities.
In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell]
     Full Idea: The statement that a class is to be represented by a symbol is a definition in mathematics, and says nothing about mathematical entities. Any formula can be stated in terms of primitive ideas, so the definitions are superfluous.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §412)
     A reaction: [compressed wording] I'm not sure that everyone would agree with this (e.g. Kit Fine), as certain types of numbers seem to be introduced by stipulative definitions.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell]
     Full Idea: In the objectionable kind of infinite regress, some propositions join to constitute the meaning of some proposition, but one of them is similarly compounded, and so ad infinitum. This comes from circular definitions, where the term defined reappears.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §329)
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell]
     Full Idea: Every proposition function …has, in addition to its range of truth, a range of significance, i.e. a range within which x must lie if φ(x) is to be a proposition at all, whether true or false. This is the first point of the theory of types.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App B:523), quoted by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.2
     A reaction: Magidor quotes this as the origin of the idea of a 'category mistake'. It is the basis of the formal theory of types, but is highly influential in philosophy generally, especially as a criterion for ruling many propositions as 'meaningless'.