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3 ideas
20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: If we specify the 'necessary' conditions that are 'sufficient' for something's being an X, that is a combination of conditions such that all and only Xs meet them, which is the hallmark of a definition of X-hood. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.1) | |
A reaction: There are, of course, many other ways to define something, as shown in the 2.D Reason | Definition section of this database. This nicely summarises the classical view. |
20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
Full Idea: According to the feminist critique, ideologies that operate as tools of political repression are falsely represented as definitions possessing a timeless, natural, asocial, universal objectivity. | |
From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I suppose this does not just apply to definitions, but to all expressions of ideologically repressive strategy. I'm trying to think of an example of a specifically feminist problem case. Davies doesn't cite anyone. |
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
Full Idea: In all inductive reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of uniformity in nature; or, roughly speaking, that the future will, in the appropriate respects, resemble the past. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii) | |
A reaction: I would say that nature is 'stable'. Nature changes, so a global assumption of total uniformity is daft. Do we need some global uniformity assumptions, if the induction involved is local? I would say yes. Are all inductions conditional on this? |