display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
| 10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Burge has argued that Frege's rationalism runs very deep. Frege holds that there is a natural order of thoughts to which human thinking is naturally drawn. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Stephen Yablo - Carving Content at the Joints § 8 | |
| A reaction: [Yablo cites Burge 1984,1992,1998] What an intriguing idea. I always start from empiricist beginnings, but some aspects of rationalism just sieze you by the throat. |
| 9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
| Full Idea: Frege left no place for a category of the intersubjective, intermediate between the wholly objective and the radically subjective. | |
| From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.7 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. More sophisticated accounts of language (with the Private Language Argument as background) hold out possibilities of objectivity arising from an articulate community. See Idea 95. |
| 8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
| Full Idea: Always separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], Intro p.x) | |
| A reaction: This (with Ideas 7732 and 8415) is said to be the foundation of modern analytical philosophy. It contrasts with Husserl's 'Logical Investigations', which are the foundations of phenomenology. I think it is time someone challenged Frege here. |
| 9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In his middle period, Frege became hostile to contextual definitions, and any definition other than an explicit one, ..but at the time of the 'Grundlagen' he conceived of his context principle as licensing contextual definitions. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.11 | |
| A reaction: His context principle says words only have a meaning in a context. Intuitively, I would say that there is no correct answer to how something should be defined. Totally circularity is hopeless, but presuppositions just weaken a definition. |
| 9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Frege appeals to a general principle that nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §64) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: The point is that the terms of the definition would depend on the thing being defined. But of all the elusive concepts, that of 'conceptual priority' is one of the slipperiest. An example is the question of precedence between 'parallel' and 'direction'. |
| 17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
| Full Idea: Proof has as its goal not only to raise the truth of a proposition above all doubts, but additionally to provide insight into the interdependence of truths. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §02) | |
| A reaction: This is a major idea in Frege's thinking, and a reason why he is the father of modern metaphysics as well as the father of modern logic. You study the framework of truths by studying the logic that connects them. |
| 8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
| Full Idea: It would be remarkable if a property abstracted from external things could be transferred without any change of sense to events, to ideas and to concepts, like speaking of 'blue ideas' or 'salty concepts'. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §24) | |
| A reaction: Since those phrases make perfectly good metaphorical sense, I presume the Frege was a fairly literal sort of chap. Is this the earliest emergence of the idea of a category mistake? |