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5 ideas
17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Definitions of things which may be understood to have some cause, must consist of such names as express the cause or manner of their generation, as when we define a circle to be a figure made by the circumduction of a straight line in a plane etc. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.13) | |
A reaction: His account of the circle is based on its mode of construction, which is the preferred account of Euclid, rather than a statement of its pure nature. |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Definitions to my mind are real, when one knows that the thing defined is possible; otherwise they are only nominal, and one must not rely on them. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 XI) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that things do not have to actual to have real definitions. For Leibniz, what is possible will exist in the mind of God. For me what is possible will exist in the potentialities of the powers of what is actual. |
17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The definition is nothing but a resolution of the name into its most universal parts; ...definitions of this kind always consist of genus and difference; the former names being all, till the last, general; and the last of all, difference. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.14) | |
A reaction: This is basically the scholastic Aristotelian view of definition. Note that Hobbes explicitly denies that the last step of the definition is general in character. |
17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A defined name ought not to be repeated in the definition. ...No total can be part of itself. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.15) |
17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: 'Petitio principii' is when the conclusion to be proved is disguised in other words, and put for the definition or principle from whence it is to be demonstrated. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.18) |