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Ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth', 'works' and 'A Conversation: what is it? What is it for?'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze]
     Full Idea: You should not try to find whether an idea is just or correct. You should look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, so that something passes between the two which is neither in one nor the other.
     From: Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
     A reaction: Neither relativism nor dialectic. Sounds like just having fun with ideas, but a commentator tells me it is a strategy for liberating our thought, following an agenda created by Nietzsche.
Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze]
     Full Idea: It is always possible to undo dualisms from the inside, by tracing the line of flight which passes between the two terms or the two sets …and which draws both into a non-parallel evolution. At least this does not belong to the dialectic.
     From: Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], II)
     A reaction: Deleuze disliked Hegel's version of the dialectic. Not clear what he means here, but he is evidently groping for an alternative account of the reasoning process, which is interesting. Deleuze hates rigid dualisms.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach]
     Full Idea: Explicit definitions allow for a complete elimination of the defined notion (at least in extensional contexts).
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 1)
     A reaction: If the context isn't extensional (concerning the things themselves) then we could define one description of it, but be unable to eliminate it under another description. Elimination is no the aim of an Aristotelian definition. Halbach refers to truth.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach]
     Full Idea: Arguments from analogy are to be distrusted: at best they can serve as heuristics.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 4)