display all the ideas for this combination of texts
22 ideas
6564 | To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not' [Quine] |
Full Idea: To affirm a compound of the form 'p and not-p' is just to have mislearned one or both of these particles. | |
From: Willard Quine (From Stimulus to Science [1995], p.23), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Quoted by Fogelin. This summarises the view of logic developed by the young Wittgenstein, that logical terms are 'operators', rather than referring terms. Of course the speaker may have a compartmentalised mind, or not understand 'p' properly. |
18019 | People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor] |
Full Idea: It is an empirical fact that people often sincerely report having had dreams which involve category mistakes. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.4) | |
A reaction: She doesn't give any examples, but I was thinking that this might be the case before I read this idea. Dreams seem to allow you to live with gaps in reality that we don't tolerate when awake. |
17998 | Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor] |
Full Idea: A plausible case can be made for explaining the phenomenon of category mistakes in terms of each of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I want to explain them in terms of (structured) ontology, but she totally rejects that on p.156. Her preferred account is that they are presupposition failures, which is pragmatics. She splits the semantic view into truth-valued and non-truth-valued. |
18011 | Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor] |
Full Idea: The infelicity of category mistakes seems to be universal across languages. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Magidor rightly offers this fact to refute the claim that category mistakes are purely syntax (since syntax obviously varies hugely across languages). I also take the fact to show that category mistakes concern the world, and not merely language. |
18012 | Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor] |
Full Idea: A syntactic theory of category mistakes would require not only general syntactic features such as must-be-human, but also highly particular ones such as must-be-a-grape. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Her grape example comes from Hebrew, but an English example might be the verb 'to hull', which is largely exclusive to strawberries. The 'must-be' form is one of Chomsky's 'selectional features'. |
18013 | Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor] |
Full Idea: The embedding data (such as 'John said that the number two is green', compared to '*John said that me likes apples') strongly suggests that category mistakes are not syntactically ill-formed. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 2.4) | |
A reaction: Sounds conclusive. The report of John's category error, unlike the report of his remark about apples, seems perfectly syntactically acceptable. |
18021 | Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor] |
Full Idea: Metaphors must have literal meanings. …Since many metaphors involving category mistakes manage to achieve their metaphorical purpose, they must also have literal meanings, so category mistakes must be (literally) meaningful. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.5) | |
A reaction: Hm. 'This guy is so weird that to meet him is to encounter a circular square'. |
18015 | The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor] |
Full Idea: The principle that if a competent speaker understands some terms then they understand a sentence made up of them entails that category mistakes are meaningful (as in understanding 'the number two' and 'is green'). | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.2.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed version] It is normal to impose restrictions on plausible compositionality, and thus back away from this claim, but I rather sympathise with it. She adds to a second version of the principle the proviso 'IF the sentence is meaningful'. |
18017 | If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor] |
Full Idea: Two sentences are synonymous if they have the same meaning, suggesting that they must both be meaningful. On the face of it the English 'two is green' and French 'deux est vert' are synonymous, suggesting meaningful category mistakes. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I'm fairly convinced already that most category mistakes are meaningful, and this seems to confirm the view. Some mistakes could be so extreme that no auditor could compute their meaning, especially if you concatenated lots of them. |
18031 | If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor] |
Full Idea: One motivation for taking category mistakes to be meaningless is that one cannot even imagine what it would take for 'Two is green' to be true. …Underlying this complaint is sometimes the thought that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-conditions. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.6) | |
A reaction: I defend the view that most sentences are meaningful if they compose from meaningful parts, but you have to acknowledge this view. It seems to come in degrees. Sentences can have fragmentary meaning, or be almost meaningful, or offer a glimpse of meaning? |
18016 | Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor] |
Full Idea: The principle that if 'p' and 'q' are meaningful sentences then 'p and q' is a meaningful sentence seems highly plausible. But now consider the following example: 'That is a number and that is green'. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.2.2) | |
A reaction: This challenges the defence of the meaningfulness of category mistakes on the basis of strong compositionality. |
18030 | A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor] |
Full Idea: The meaninglessness view does seem to offer a simple and compelling explanation for the fact that category mistakes are highly infelicitous. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.6) | |
A reaction: However, I take there to be quite a large gulf between why meaningless sentences like 'squares turn happiness into incommensurability', which I would call 'category blunders', and subtle category mistakes, which are meaningful. |
18032 | Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor] |
Full Idea: No sense experience shows that 'two is green' is true or false. But neither is 'two is green' analytically true or false. So it fails to have legitimate verification conditions and hence, by the lights of traditional verificationism, it is meaningless. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.6.2) | |
A reaction: If a category mistake is an error in classification, then it would seem to be analytically false. If it wrongly attributes a property to something, that makes it verifiably false. The problem is to verify anything at all about 'two'. |
18034 | Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor] |
Full Idea: One might argue that conceptual role semantics entails that category mistakes are meaningless. Sentences such as 'two is green' play no role in the cognitive life of any agent. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.6.2) | |
A reaction: [She quotes Block's definition of conceptual role semantics] I would have thought that if a category mistake is believed by an agent, it could play a huge role in their cognitive life. |
18037 | Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor] |
Full Idea: One might argue that although 'two' refers to the number two, and 'is green' expresses the property of being green, in 'two is green' the property somehow fails to apply to the number two. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 4.2) | |
A reaction: It is an interesting thought that you say something which applies a predicate to an object, but the predicate then 'fails to apply' for reasons of its own, over which you have no control. The only possible cause of the failure is the nature of reality. |
18039 | If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor] |
Full Idea: Having rejected the syntactic approach and the meaninglessness view, one might feel that the last resort for explaining the defectiveness of category mistakes is to claim that they are truth-valueless (even if meaningful). | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 4.3.1) | |
A reaction: She rejects this one as well, and votes for a pragmatic explanation, in terms of presupposition failure. The view I incline towards is just that they are false, despite being well-formed, meaningful and truth-valued. |
18058 | Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor] |
Full Idea: The most promising way to characterise the presuppositions involved in category mistakes might be to rephrase them in modal terms ('x is able to be pregnant', 'x is able to be green'). | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 5.4.3) | |
A reaction: This catches my attention because it suggests that category mistakes contradict dispositions, rather than contradicting classifications or types. 'Let's use a magnet to repel this iron'? The dispositions of 'two' and 'green' in 'two is green'? Hm |
18041 | Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor] |
Full Idea: I argue that category mistakes are infelicitous because they suffer from (pragmatic) presupposition failure, ...but I reject the 'naive pragmatic approach' according to which category mistakes are infelicitous because they are trivially true or false. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 5.1) | |
A reaction: She supports her case quite well, but I vote for them being false. The falsity may involve presuppositions. 'Two is green' is a category mistake, and false, because 'two' lacks the preconditions for anything to be coloured (notably, emitting light). |
18056 | Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor] |
Full Idea: I am assuming that even in those contexts in which the presupposition of 'the number two is green' fails and the utterance is infelicitious, it nevertheless receives a bivalent truth-value (presumably 'false'). | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 5.4.1) | |
A reaction: It seems to me obvious that, in normal contexts, 'the number two is green' is false, rather than meaningless. Is 'the number eight is an odd number' meaningless? |
18055 | In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor] |
Full Idea: My proposal is that the truth-conditional content of 'green' (in 'two is green') is the property of being green, and its presuppositional content is the property of being coloured. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 5.4.1) | |
A reaction: This requires a two-dimensional semantics of truth-conditional and presuppositional content. I fear it may have a problem she spotted elsewhere, of overgenerating presuppositions. Eyes are presupposed by 'green'. Ambient light is required. |
18057 | 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor] |
Full Idea: 'The number two is green' is normally infelicitous, but, interestingly, 'numbers are coloured and the number two is green' is not infelicitous. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 5.4.1) | |
A reaction: A nice example, which gives good support for her pragmatic account of category mistakes in terms of presupposition failure. But how about 'figures can have contradictory shapes, and this square is circular'? Numbers are not coloured!!! |
18059 | The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor] |
Full Idea: My pragmatic account of category mistakes does not support a key role for them in metaphysics. It is highly doubtful that the presuppositions associated with category mistakes reveal anything about the fundamental nature of ontological categories. | |
From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Thus she dashes my hope, without even bothering to offer a reason. I think she should push her enquiry further, and ask why we presuppose things. Why do we take presuppositions for granted? Why are they obvious? |