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3 ideas
| 3801 | Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: We must assume that something matters - that some things are for better and some things are for worse, for without that our assumed rationality would have nothing on which to get a purchase. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.1) | |
| A reaction: It does seem that rationality wouldn't exist as an activity without some value to motivate it. |
| 6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Any definition must presuppose the notion of identity precisely because a definition affirms the identity of two concepts. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: McGinn is arguing that identity is fundamental to thought, and this seems persuasive. It may be, though, that while identities are inescapable, definitions are impossible. |
| 6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Regresses are only vicious in the context of some explanatory aim, not in themselves. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2 n11) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. It is not quite clear how 'pure' reason could ever be vicious, or charming, or sycophantic. The problem about a vicious regress is precisely that it fails to explain anything. Now benign regresses are something else… (see Idea 2523) |