Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'Metaphysics' and 'Meaning and Necessity'
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29 ideas
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
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623
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It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle]
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
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1601
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The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle]
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6561
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A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle]
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1602
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For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle]
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11281
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We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle]
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11282
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Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis]
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
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608
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There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle]
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
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627
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If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle]
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628
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Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
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10957
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The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle]
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10953
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The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle]
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10960
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If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
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16094
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You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
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10944
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A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle]
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596
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Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle]
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16107
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Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle]
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12360
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Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
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12355
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'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle]
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12352
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Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle]
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11383
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A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle]
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10961
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Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle]
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12356
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If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle]
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17040
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If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle]
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12353
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Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
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12081
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Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
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12080
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Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt]
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11153
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A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
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15770
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Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle]
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2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
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574
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Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle]
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