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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari)' and 'De Anima'

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3 ideas

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
22501 Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche thought profoundly mistaken a taxonomy that classified actions as the doing of this or that, insisting that the true nature of an action depended rather on the nature of the individual who did it.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari) [1885], 7) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 7
     A reaction: This is more in the spirit of Aristotle than in the modern legalistic style. It seems to totally ignore consequences, which would puzzle victims or beneficiaries of the action.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
24060 Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Self-controlled people, even when they desire and have an appetite for things, do not do these things for which they have the desire, but instead follow the understanding.
     From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a06)
     A reaction: If modern discussions would stop talking of 'weakness of will', and talk instead of 'control' and its lack, the whole issue would become clearer. Akrasia is then seen, for example, as an action of the whole person, not of some defective part.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
22500 Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: To threaten morality Nietzsche needed to show not only that free will was an illusion, but also that no other distinction between voluntary and involuntary action (Aristotle's, for instance) would do instead. He seems to be wrong about this.
     From: comment on Friedrich Nietzsche (Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari) [1885], 7) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness
     A reaction: Just the idea I have been seeking! There is no free will, so in what way are we responsible? Simple: we are responsible for any act which can be shown to be voluntary. It can't just be any action we fully caused, because of accidents.