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3 ideas
20133 | The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The so-called 'motive' is another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness - something alongside the deed which is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deed than to represent them. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.3) | |
A reaction: [Leiter gives 'VI.3', but I can't find it] As far as you can get from intellectualism about action, and is more in accord with the picture found in modern neuro-science. No one knows why they are 'interested' in something, and that's the start of it. |
22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
Full Idea: The 'remainder' after a dilemma can't be a matter of apology and restitution, because the dilemma may only involve the agent's own life, and in the case of broken promises we only owe an explanation, if the breaking is justifiable. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Dilemmas Revisited [1995], p.183) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: But what if someone has been financially ruined by it? If the agent feels guilty about that, is getting over it the rational thing to do? (Foot says that is an new obligation, and not part of the original dilemma). |
22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
Full Idea: I do not see how …we can know how to interpret the idea of a situation in which someone will necessarily be wrong whatever he does. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Dilemmas Revisited [1995], p.188) | |
A reaction: Seems right. If you think of hideous dilemmas (frequent in wartime), there must always be a right thing to do (or two equally right things to do), even if the outcome is fairly hideous. Just distinguish the right from the good. |