display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
Full Idea: A well-ordered set of preferences is typically the result of successful deliberation, and is not its precondition. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
Full Idea: If I desire to get rid of my flu symptoms, and believe the only way to do it is death, I am committed to desiring my death. …there is no plausible logic of practical reason. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.8.II) |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
Full Idea: The single greatest difference between humans and other animals as far as rationality is concerned is our ability to create, recognise and act on desire-independent reasons for action. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II) |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
Full Idea: Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act. | |
From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6 App) |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: He who makes moral progress to the highest degree performs all the appropriate actions in all circumstances, and omits none. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Sophocles - Sophocles' Electra 4.39.22 | |
A reaction: Hence concerns about omission as well as commission in the practice of ethics can be seen in the light of character and virtue. The world is fully of nice people who act well, but don't do so well on omissions. Car drivers, for example. |