display all the ideas for this combination of texts
28 ideas
| 4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle does not fully endorse the famous first sentence of the 'Ethics'; he does not think every action aims at some good - for one thing akratic action does not. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094a03) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.91 n25 | |
| A reaction: Nice point. Aristotle's claim never sounded right, and yet vice presumably aims at what it perceives as good. Socrates presumably endorses the opening sentence, though Aristotle wouldn't. |
| 23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: In Aristotle choices are not explained in terms of a will, but in terms of the attachment of reason to the good, however conceived, and the exercise of reason to determine how the good might best be obtained. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b11-24) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: I am personally happy to use the concept of the 'will', as the faculty which makes the final arbitration between competing mental drives, but this idea shows that the whole issue could be managed without it. |
| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In cases where the movement of the limbs that are the instruments of action has its origin in the agent himself, it is in his power either to act or not, and therefore such actions are voluntary. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110a15) | |
| A reaction: He asserts this to show that an action is voluntary even under extreme compulsion or pressure. This seems right, and moves the focus to the concept of an 'excuse', which covers forgivable voluntary actions. |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In every case a man stops inquiring how to act when he has traced the starting-point of action back to himself, i.e. to the dominant part of himself; for it is this that makes the choice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113a06) | |
| A reaction: A footnote says the 'dominant part' of the soul is reason. If we dispense with 'free will' (and we should), this is the core of moral responsibility. Responsible actions are those caused by the dominant part of the mind. |
| 4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of akrasia seems to leave the vital point unexplained, which is why the better syllogism is overcome. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b14) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.85 | |
| A reaction: The problem is where exactly the action originates within us - is it sometimes from deliberation, and sometimes from some irrational force? Either akrasia is easy and action baffling, or vice versa. |
| 68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The incontinent man (weak-willed, 'akrates') acts from desire but not from choice, but the continent man (controlled, 'enkrates') acts from choice but not from desire. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b14) | |
| A reaction: These two categories are contrasted with the truly wicked and the truly good, in both of whom choice and desire work together. The akrates and the enkrates include most people, hovering in the middle ground of moral apprenticeship. |
| 4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: Morality rises from vice (bad reason, bad feeling, bad action), to akrasia ('no control', but get the reason right), to enkrateia (wrong feeling, but right reason and action), culminating in virtue (right feeling, as well as right reason and action). | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b15) by John Cottingham - Reason, Emotions and Good Life p.1 | |
| A reaction: Very illuminating, especially for showing the importance of feeling in Aristotle's account. True virtue is effortless, not steely control. This has to be right, and seems to differ from Kant. |
| 4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: According to Aristotle, the incontinent person never acts against active knowledge of particulars, but either acts against knowledge that is possessed but not exercised, or knowledge that is not fully possessed, or against knowledge of universals alone. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b15) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 2.1 | |
| A reaction: This comments aims to bring Aristotle closer to Socrates (who says virtue IS reason), and it certainly fits with the high value which Aristotle normally places on reason. |
| 5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some thinkers say that when some people are unable to resist pleasures then what they have is not knowledge but only opinion. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b33) | |
| A reaction: You would have thought that people take their own opinions for knowledge, but Aristotle seems to refer to weakly held beliefs. Aristotle allows that this might excuse mild misbehaviour, but not true vice. |
| 5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is quite possible for a person who has knowledge of both universal and particular to act inconsistently with his knowledge, if he is exercising knowledge of the universal but not of the particular. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1147a01) | |
| A reaction: In this way Aristotle says (at 1147b15) that he can agree with Socrates about akrasia. I.e. that the evil deed does indeed arise from some sort of ignorance (perhaps of the relevant particular), and not just from desire. |
| 23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle explicitly characterises akrasia cases as ones in which one acts against one's choices [prohairesis], rather than as cases in which one chooses to act against reason. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148a09) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: The point is that Socrates and Plato give reason top authority, and Aristotle is not undermining that. Akrasia is a mistake at a lower level. Frede's discussion is subtle! |
| 23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: It is past failures (of training, discipline, reflection…), rather than a specific mental event, a choice or a decision, which in Aristotle accounts for akratic action. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148a10) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: This is to demonstrate that Aristotle has no concept of a 'will' which arbitrates over difficult choices. What we call 'willing' he applies only to choices which are rational. |
| 5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The licentious man is unrepentant, because he abides by his choice; but the incontinent (weak-willed) man is always capable of repentance. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1150b28) | |
| A reaction: This is the very important feature of virtue theory - that what happens AFTER the action is almost as important as what happens before and during it. Character can be revealed just as much by pride or regret for an action. |
| 69 | We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We deliberate not about ends, but about means. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b12) | |
| A reaction: A young person choosing a career path probably ought to deliberate about ends, as well as means. Is he implying at ends are irrational? That sounds unlikely. |
| 5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Prudence ('phronesis') is not concerned with universals only; it must also take cognizance of particulars, because it is concerned with conduct, and conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1141b14) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'phronesis' is partly concerned with universals, although it is crucial to Aristotle's theory that each particular situation is different, and so no rules can actually dictate moral action. |
| 80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim, and prudence that of the means towards it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a07) | |
| A reaction: I'm not wholly clear about how virtue identifies correct aims. Virtue finds the mean, but how? Prudence is busy with strategy. Theoretical reason stands back from the world. A gap in the theory? |
| 5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One cannot be prudent (have practical reason) without being good. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a33) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that for Aristotle this is more of a tautology than an observation. We might think of a very clever criminal as having 'phronesis' (practical reason), but Aristotle simply wouldn't, though he has no simple explanation for his view. |
| 82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The possession of the single virtue of prudence will carry with it the possession of them all. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a02) | |
| A reaction: Prudence is phronesis, of which I prefer the translation 'common sense', thought he scholars call it 'practical wisdom'. People can be sensible in one are, and stupid in another. |
| 20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Practical reason [phronesis] is a truth-attaining intellectual quality concerned with doing, and with the things that are good for human beings. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1140b21) | |
| A reaction: [tr. Greenwood] That sounds suspiciously like wisdom to me. Or maybe wisdom also has a contemplative aspect. |
| 73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The function of practical intellect is to arrive at the truth that corresponds to right appetite. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139a28) | |
| A reaction: And right appetite may well have to be educated by theoretical intellect. |
| 4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, practical perception is perception of particulars as parts of larger wholes, which involves the perception of their value (as in seeing my food as part of bodily health, and all action as part of a flourishing life). | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro | |
| A reaction: An appealing idea. Hume (who separates facts from values) would call it rubbish, but with the addition of a premiss like "life is good", this seems plausible and appealing. |
| 67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every bad man is ignorant of what he ought to do and refrain from doing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110b29) | |
| A reaction: This sounds more like the view on akrasia of Socrates than that of Aristotle. Aristotle thinks bad people can also know what is good, but be pulled away from it by strong desires. |
| 5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems that the same people are not equally good at choosing the best actions and forming the best opinions; some are comparatively good at forming opinions, but through a moral defect fail to make the right choices. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112a09) | |
| A reaction: It is not enough to say that they CAN be separate. What type of opinions? Wise actors rarely have stupid opinions, and the opinions of bad actors usually contain error. See Jane Austen. |
| 81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whereas Socrates thought that the virtues are principles (because they are forms of knowledge), we say they imply a principle (practical reason). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144b30) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to pin down how rational an Aristotelian virtue is supposed to be. Is a virtue a quasi-platonic vision of 'the good', but in each specific area, rather than in general? |
| 5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is our reasoned acts that are held to be in the fullest sense voluntary and our own doing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1169a01) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me crucial in morality. Morality concerns important decisions made by the core of a person. If we ask how 'core decisions' are known, their hallmark will be reasons, because reasons are the peak of human awareness. |
| 5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: When a man repents of an act done through ignorance, he is considered to have acted involuntarily; but a man who does not repent of such an act is another case, so he may be said to have acted non-voluntarily. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110b22) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me as crucial to virtue theory that how you acted could be partly decided by your attitude AFTER the event. There is a 'residue' (Hursthouse) to every action, of guilt, pride etc. 'Voluntary' evidently has internal/external components. |
| 4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle seems to define responsibility negatively: I am responsible for an action if and only if I do it neither by force nor because of ignorance. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1114b13) by Terence Irwin - Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle p.117 | |
| A reaction: Reminiscent of David Hume, suggesting that Aristotle may at heart be a determinist, because he lacks any positive notion of free will? |
| 5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Presumably there are some things such that a man cannot be compelled to do them - that he must sooner die than do, though he suffer the most dreadful fate. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110a27) | |
| A reaction: This is a central concept for virtue theory - that no possible 'utilitarian calculation' could allow a virtuous person to do some awful thing because of a cool assessment that it will eventually add up to increased happiness. |