display all the ideas for this combination of texts
13 ideas
| 4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle does not fully endorse the famous first sentence of the 'Ethics'; he does not think every action aims at some good - for one thing akratic action does not. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094a03) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.91 n25 | |
| A reaction: Nice point. Aristotle's claim never sounded right, and yet vice presumably aims at what it perceives as good. Socrates presumably endorses the opening sentence, though Aristotle wouldn't. |
| 23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: In Aristotle choices are not explained in terms of a will, but in terms of the attachment of reason to the good, however conceived, and the exercise of reason to determine how the good might best be obtained. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b11-24) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: I am personally happy to use the concept of the 'will', as the faculty which makes the final arbitration between competing mental drives, but this idea shows that the whole issue could be managed without it. |
| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In cases where the movement of the limbs that are the instruments of action has its origin in the agent himself, it is in his power either to act or not, and therefore such actions are voluntary. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110a15) | |
| A reaction: He asserts this to show that an action is voluntary even under extreme compulsion or pressure. This seems right, and moves the focus to the concept of an 'excuse', which covers forgivable voluntary actions. |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In every case a man stops inquiring how to act when he has traced the starting-point of action back to himself, i.e. to the dominant part of himself; for it is this that makes the choice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113a06) | |
| A reaction: A footnote says the 'dominant part' of the soul is reason. If we dispense with 'free will' (and we should), this is the core of moral responsibility. Responsible actions are those caused by the dominant part of the mind. |
| 4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of akrasia seems to leave the vital point unexplained, which is why the better syllogism is overcome. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b14) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.85 | |
| A reaction: The problem is where exactly the action originates within us - is it sometimes from deliberation, and sometimes from some irrational force? Either akrasia is easy and action baffling, or vice versa. |
| 68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The incontinent man (weak-willed, 'akrates') acts from desire but not from choice, but the continent man (controlled, 'enkrates') acts from choice but not from desire. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b14) | |
| A reaction: These two categories are contrasted with the truly wicked and the truly good, in both of whom choice and desire work together. The akrates and the enkrates include most people, hovering in the middle ground of moral apprenticeship. |
| 4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: Morality rises from vice (bad reason, bad feeling, bad action), to akrasia ('no control', but get the reason right), to enkrateia (wrong feeling, but right reason and action), culminating in virtue (right feeling, as well as right reason and action). | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b15) by John Cottingham - Reason, Emotions and Good Life p.1 | |
| A reaction: Very illuminating, especially for showing the importance of feeling in Aristotle's account. True virtue is effortless, not steely control. This has to be right, and seems to differ from Kant. |
| 4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: According to Aristotle, the incontinent person never acts against active knowledge of particulars, but either acts against knowledge that is possessed but not exercised, or knowledge that is not fully possessed, or against knowledge of universals alone. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b15) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 2.1 | |
| A reaction: This comments aims to bring Aristotle closer to Socrates (who says virtue IS reason), and it certainly fits with the high value which Aristotle normally places on reason. |
| 5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some thinkers say that when some people are unable to resist pleasures then what they have is not knowledge but only opinion. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b33) | |
| A reaction: You would have thought that people take their own opinions for knowledge, but Aristotle seems to refer to weakly held beliefs. Aristotle allows that this might excuse mild misbehaviour, but not true vice. |
| 5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is quite possible for a person who has knowledge of both universal and particular to act inconsistently with his knowledge, if he is exercising knowledge of the universal but not of the particular. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1147a01) | |
| A reaction: In this way Aristotle says (at 1147b15) that he can agree with Socrates about akrasia. I.e. that the evil deed does indeed arise from some sort of ignorance (perhaps of the relevant particular), and not just from desire. |
| 23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle explicitly characterises akrasia cases as ones in which one acts against one's choices [prohairesis], rather than as cases in which one chooses to act against reason. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148a09) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: The point is that Socrates and Plato give reason top authority, and Aristotle is not undermining that. Akrasia is a mistake at a lower level. Frede's discussion is subtle! |
| 23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: It is past failures (of training, discipline, reflection…), rather than a specific mental event, a choice or a decision, which in Aristotle accounts for akratic action. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148a10) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: This is to demonstrate that Aristotle has no concept of a 'will' which arbitrates over difficult choices. What we call 'willing' he applies only to choices which are rational. |
| 5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The licentious man is unrepentant, because he abides by his choice; but the incontinent (weak-willed) man is always capable of repentance. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1150b28) | |
| A reaction: This is the very important feature of virtue theory - that what happens AFTER the action is almost as important as what happens before and during it. Character can be revealed just as much by pride or regret for an action. |