Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'New Proof of Possibility of Well-Ordering' and 'Nicomachean Ethics'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
28 ideas
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
4380
|
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
|
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
23320
|
Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
5211
|
An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
|
5221
|
Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
|
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
4383
|
Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
|
68
|
The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
|
4318
|
Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
|
4372
|
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
|
5254
|
Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
|
5255
|
A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
|
23317
|
Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
23318
|
Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
5257
|
Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
|
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
69
|
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
|
5247
|
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
|
80
|
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
|
5249
|
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
|
82
|
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
|
20212
|
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
|
73
|
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
|
4371
|
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
|
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
67
|
Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
|
5218
|
Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
|
81
|
For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
|
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
5267
|
Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
|
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
5213
|
If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
|
4384
|
For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
|
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
5212
|
A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]
|