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Ideas for
'Action', 'The Approach to Metaphysics' and 'Frege on Knowing the Foundations'
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31 ideas
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20035
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Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
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20084
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Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
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20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20061
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Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
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20079
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Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
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20080
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If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
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20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
20059
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I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
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20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20081
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Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20044
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The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
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20039
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The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
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20047
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Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
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20065
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Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
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20067
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You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
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20078
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The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
20036
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Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
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20066
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Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20073
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Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
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20069
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A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
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20070
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An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
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20071
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An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
20038
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If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20050
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Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
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20052
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If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
20077
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If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
20049
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Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
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20046
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For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20060
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Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
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20055
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A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
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20056
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In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
20053
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An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
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20048
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There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
20068
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Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
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