Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit', 'The Need for Roots' and 'Confessions'

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6 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
23854 Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil]
     Full Idea: When the subject in question is the good, beauty is a rigorous and positive proof.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing')
     A reaction: Purest platonism! It is incomprehensible to say 'this thing is evil, but it is beautiful'. But there are plenty of things which strike me as beautiful, without connecting that in any way to moral goodness.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6237 Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
     Full Idea: Conscience is to find horribly offensive the reflection of any unjust action or behaviour; to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience; …thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience.
     From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I)
     A reaction: The reply from religion would be that the Deity has implanted natural conscience in each creature, though this seems to deny our freedom of moral judgment. Personally I am inclined to think that values are just observations of the world - such as health.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6234 If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
     Full Idea: If a creature wanting reason has many good qualities and affections, it is certain that if you give this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness and pity.
     From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.III.III)
     A reaction: A wonderful denunciation of the authority of reason, which must have influenced David Hume. I think, though, that the inverse of this case must be considered (if suddenly given feelings, they would fall in line with reasoning). We reason about feelings.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6233 A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
     Full Idea: We do not say that he is a good man when, having his hands tied up, he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs; …hence it is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, natural or unnatural.
     From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I)
     A reaction: Note that he more or less equates being morally 'ill' with being 'unnatural'. We tend to reserve 'unnatural' for extreme or perverse crimes. Personally I would place more emphasis on evil judgements, and less on evil feelings.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
22985 Everyone wants happiness [Augustine]
     Full Idea: Surely happiness is what everyone wants, so much so that there can be none who do not want it?
     From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.20)
     A reaction: His concept of happiness is, of course, religious. Occasionally you meet habitual grumblers about life who give the impression that they are only happy when they are discontented. So happiness is achieving desires, not feeling good?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
6236 People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury]
     Full Idea: How much the social pleasures are superior to any other may be known by visible tokens and effects; the marks and signs which attend this sort of joy are more intense and clear than those which attend the satisfaction of thirst and hunger.
     From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I)
     A reaction: He presumably refers to smiles and laughter, but they could be misleading as they are partly a means of social communication. You should ask people whether they would prefer a nice conversation or a good pork chop. Nice point, though.