display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 2360 | 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth 'Good'; and the object of his hate or aversion 'Evil'. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06) | |
| A reaction: This meets the Frege-Geach Problem - that we can have these feelings while reading ancient history, but we can't possibly 'desire' any of that. This is better on evil than on good. |
| 2368 | Men's natural desires are no sin, and neither are their actions, until law makes it so [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.13) | |
| A reaction: That is a pretty flat rejection of natural law, as you might expect from an empiricist. So prior to the first law-making, no one ever did anything wrong? Hm. |
| 14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called death. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.334) | |
| A reaction: The point, presumably, is that one phase of an organisms moves into another, and the 'individuals' are not distinct enough for their 'death' to be a significant transition. A nicely mind-expanding thought. |
| 2359 | Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: Desire and love are the same thing, save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object, by love most commonly the presence of the same. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06) | |
| A reaction: Implausible reductivism from Hobbes. Plenty of counterexamples to this. You work it out! |
| 2370 | All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes] |
| Full Idea: Of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. | |
| From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14) | |
| A reaction: Nonsense. You can only describe sacrificial acts for loved ones, such as children, in this way if this proposal is a tautology. Hobbes cannot know the truth of this claim. |